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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VULCAN STEEL CORPORATION, 
Plaintif !-Appellant, 
vs. 
ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN, 
Plaintif /-Respondent, 
vs. 
\'UL CAN STEEL CORPORATION 
and J. DEAN GERSTNER, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
VULCAN STEEL CORPORATION 
and J. DEAN GERSTNER, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
115'54 
This action is a consolidation of three lawsuits involv-
ing the rights and dbligations of Vulcan Steel Corporation 
and its two shareholders J. Dean Gerstner and Abraham 
Markosian. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On February 24, 1969, the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered 
an order granting respondent Markosian's Motion for Par-
tial Summary Judgment thereby requiring Vulcan Steel 
Corporation to redeem Abraham Markosian's stock at a 
price to be determined in accordance with a certain agree-
ment executed on April 12, 1965. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the lower court's Order 
of Partial Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the spring of 1965, J. Dean Gerstner and Abraham 
Markosian commenced negotiations to organize a steel fab-
ricating business. At that time Gerstner was a majority 
shareholder in several family corporations engaged in the 
steel business and had a steel plant, machinery, equipment 
and steel inventories located in Salt Lake City, Utah. On 
April 12, 1965, Markosian and Gerstner executed an Agree· 
ment whereby the parties would commence the steel fabri· 
eating business at the Gerstner plant site under the name 
of Vulcan Steel Corporation. Gerstner received 51 % of 
the stock of the Corporation in exchange for steel inven· 
tories located at the plant site (R. 6). Markosian sub· 
scribed to 49% of the stock to be paid as follows (R. 7): 
1. Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars in cash. 
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2. Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars on or before 
May 1, 1965. 
3. Twenty Thousand ($20,000.00) Dollars on or be-
fore April 1, 1966. 
Markosian paid the initial $10,000.00 on .the date re-
quired by the Agreement and $10,000.00 on May 5, 1965, 
but failed and refused to pay the final $20,000.00 sub-
scribed for under the Agreement on the date of April 1, 
1966, as therein provided (R. 118). 
The Agreement provided that Gerstner would be presi-
dent and treasurer of the Corporation and that Markosian 
would be vice-president, general manager and secretary 
(R. 7). The Agreement also required the Corporation to 
employ Markosian for five years at $800.00 per month plus 
5/o of the net profits before taxes (R. 7) .. In return, Mar-
kosian was required to devote his entire time and efforts 
to the affairs of the Corporation for the term of five years 
(R. 8). 
The Agreement contained restrictions on the sale of 
the stock by the parties to the extent that the Corporation 
had first option to buy in the event a party desired to dis-
pose of his stock (R. 9). However, at the request of Mar-
kosian, subparagraph 3 (c) was inserted into the Agree-
ment to provide for mandatory re-purchase of stock by the 
Corporation in the event Markosian's employment was ter-
minated by the Corporation (Markosian's Deposition, p. 
63). Subparagraph 3 (c) reads as follows (R. 10): 
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"(c) Mandatory Obligation to Purchase Stock 
Offer. 
At the termination of employment by Corporation 
of Markosian or Gerstner for any reason, it shall be 
mandatory for Corporation to purchase all of the 
stock of Markosian, Gerstner, or any stockholder or 
transferee giving written notice as herein provided 
of his or her intention to dispose of his or her stock 
" 
Whether the Corporation purchased stock under its 
first option or under the mandatory provisions of subpara-
graph 3 ( c), the purchase price was to be determined under 
the same formula. The formula, as contained in subpara-
graph 3 (c), required an increase of depreciated values to 
fair market value and the addition of good will at the rate 
of 2¥2 times the average profits for the previous five years 
(R. 10). 
On January 5, 1968, Markosian decided to terminate 
his employment with Vuloan Steel Corporation and made 
preparations to organize a new steel company known as 
Mark Steel in competition with appellant Corporation (R. 
118). Thereafter, Markosian, knowing he was quitting bus· 
iness with Vulcan Steel Corpioration, and resigning his po· 
sition as vice-president, general manager, secretary and 
director, secretly and without notice to the appellant Cor· 
poration deposited fo Vulcan Steel Corporation's account 
the sum of $20,000.00 as payment for purchase of the out· 
standing balance of his subscription obligation (R. 118). 
Thereafter, on January 23, 1968, Markosian voluntarily 
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terminated his employment with Vulcan Steel Corporation 
in a letter by his attorney which stated as follows (R. 119) : 
"Mr. Markosian suhmits herewith his resignation as 
vice-president, general manager, secretary iand as 
director of the Corporation to hecome effective as 
of the date hereof." 
Respondent in said letter demanded re-purchase by the Cor-
poration of the shares of stock owned by him in said Cor-
poration pursuant to subparagraph 3 ( c), Mandatory Ob-
ligation to Purchase Stock Offered, at 'the increased price 
therein provided (R. 119). 
The Court in its order granting respondent Markos-
ian's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment has ordered 
appellant Vulcan Steel Corporation to redeem Markosian's 
stock at the present time in accordance with the formula 
provided in the mandatory re-purchase clause (R. 136). 
Appellant Vulcan Steel Corporation appeals from that 
order. 
ARGUMENT 
THE ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT INTERPRETING THE AGREEMENT 
OF APRIL 12, 1965, TO REQUIRE A MANDA-
TORY RE..1PURCHASE OF STOCK IN THE 
EVENT OF A VOLUNTARY RESIGNATION 
BY RESPONDENT MARKOSIAN IS ERRONE-
OUS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
A. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION DIS-
REGARDS PART OF THE PARTICULAR 
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LANGUAGE PERTAINING TO TERMINA-
TION BY THE CORPORATION. 
B. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION IG-
NORES OTHER SECT I 0 N'S OF THE 
:AGREEMENT W H I C H SPECIFICALLY 
PROVIDE FOR VOLUNTARY RESIGNA-
TIONS FROM THE CORPORATION AND 
FOR THE FREE SALE OR DISPOSITION 
OF STOCK TO OUTSIDERS. 
C. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION PER-
MITS THE RESPONDENT TO PROFIT 
FROM HIS OWN WRONG BY BREACHING 
THE TERMS OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT. 
D. SUBPARAGRAPH 3 (C) SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED AGAINST RESPONDENT 
MARKOSIAN SINCE THIS PROVISION 
WAS INITIALLY DRAFTED BY HIS AT-
TORNEY. 
E. IF THE AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS 
CONCERNING A MANDATORY REPUR-
CHASE, THEN THE COURT SHOULD RE-
CEIVE P AROL EVIDENCE AS TO THE 
INTENT OF THE PARTIES BECAUSE: 
1. THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT IN-
TENDED AS AN INTEGRATED DOC-
UMENT; RATHER, IT CONTEMPLAT-
ED A SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL 
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EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WHICH 
WOULD DEFINE THE RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYMENT. 
2. THE DIVERGENT OPINIONS OF THE 
PARTIES WOULD AT LEAST INDI-
CATE THAT THE CONTRACT IS UN-
CERTAIN IN THIS REGARD AND RE-
QUIRES AMPLIFICATION BY PAROL 
EVIDENCE. 
* * * * 
A. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION DIS-
REGARDS PART OF THE PARTICULAR 
LANGUAGE PERTAINING TO TERMINA-
TION BY THE CORPORATION. 
The language in question is as follows (R. 9) : 
" ( c) Mandatory obligation to purchase stock of-
fered. At the termination of employment by Cor-
poration of Markosian or Gerstner for any reason, 
it shall be mandatory for Corporation to purchase 
all of the stock of Markosian, Gerstner, or any 
stockholder or transferee •.. " 
The interpretation adopted by the Court disregards or fails 
to give effect to the words '~by Corporation". Under such 
interpretation, those words might as well :be deleted from 
the phrase, so it would read as follows: 
"At the terminaltion of employment bY. :&11tel'8$i&Jl 
of Markosian or Gerstner for any reason •.. " 
Since those words were not deleted, but were in fact includ-
ed, they must be there for a purpose and must be given 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
meaning and effect. The intent of the Agreement by so in-
cluding them was to provide that upon the termination by 
the Corporation, there would be a mandatory repurchase. 
Thris was the protection desired by Markosian as the minor-
ity stockholder, so that if his employment relationship was 
terminated by the Corporation for any reason, his invest-
ment would not be frozen in the Corporation. He would have 
no control over such a contingency. However, he would have 
control over a voluntary resignation and therefore the 
parties provided for such contingency by permitting a vol-
untary sale, subject only to the first option rights of the 
Corporation under subparagraph 3 (b) of the Agreement. 
If the language of the mandatory repurchase clause was 
extended to all instances of termination of employment, 
whether by the Corporation or voluntarily, the Corporation 
would be powerless to resist such termination and would 
have to purchase the stock of Markosian regardless of the 
fact Markosian was the party breaching the contract. 
The mandatory repurchase provision of subparagraph 
3 ( c) contemplates action at a particular time when it 
talks about "at the termination of employment by the Car· 
poration". The only action contemplated is that by the 
Corporation. If the respondent intended any different ' 
meaning, the same could have been clearly indicated. 
That the parties contemplated the possibility of termi· 
nation by the Corporation is evidenced by language on page 
3 of the Agreement, which states: " ... unless Corporation 
notifies Markosian in writing within 60 days of the end 
of the term, or any extension thereof, of ds intention to 
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tei'minate such Agreement ." (emphasis added) (R. 
8). This provision which precedes the mandatory repur-
chase paragraph clearly indicates that the patties had in 
mind that under certain circumstances the company would 
terminate the Agreement and, therefore, it is logical for the 
parties to provide what the duties of the Corporation would 
be in such event. 
The cases hold that the word "by" contemplates action 
and the usual definition is that "by" means "through the 
means, act, or instrumentality". U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co. v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 45 P. 2d 895, 
899, 96 Colo. 571; O'Brien v. East River Bridge Co., 55 N. 
Y. S. 206, 208, 36 App. Div. 17. 
The words "by the indemnified" have been construed 
to mean "the act of the indemnified". American Credit 
Inrlemnity Co. v. Cassard, 34 A. 703, 704, 83 Md. 272. 
Words "by order of the court" or "by the court" have 
consistently been construed to mean by court action or 
under the supervision of the court. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co. 
V. Samplry, 134 S. E. 2d 71, 74, 108 Ga. App. 617; Howell 
V. Van Houten, 296 S. W. 2d 428, 430, 227 Ark. 84. 
The words "by such electors" have been construed to 
mean that the action must be by the electors and not by 
agents. O'Keeffee v. Du_qan, 172 N. Y. S. 558, 559, 185 
App. Div. 53. 
Applying the foregoing case authority to the instant 
case it is clear that action was contemplated by someone 
and the only person designated was the Corporation. We 
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are, therefore, talking about termination by Corporation 
and not termination of employment with Corporation. The 
interpretation by the Pretrial Judge is such that the words 
"by Corporation" might as well have been deleted from the 
Agreement, but since they were not deleted from the Agree-
ment, and if they are to be given some meaning, then the 
only possible meaning would be that of providing for the 
rights of the parties upon termination by the Corporation 
and not upon voluntary resignation by the respondent. 
B. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION IG-
NORES OTHER SECT I 0 NS OF THE 
AGREEMENT WHICH SPECIFICALLY 
PROVIDE FOR VOLUNTARY RESIGNA-
TIONS FROM THE CORPORATION AND 
FOR THE FREE SALE OR DISPOSITION 
OFSTOCKTOOUTfilDER& 
After discussing the rights and duties of the parties 
upon termination of employment by Corporation, the 
Agreement discusses the rights of the parties in the event 
they voluntarily decide to terminate their employment (R. 
12). Since the attention of the parties and the draftsmen 
were specifically called to the question of what should hap-
pen if the parties voluntarily resigned, the Court should 
not now read into the contract additional provisions involv· 
ing this situation not specifically specified by the parties. 
It is a fundamental rule of construction that where the 
parties have specifically discussed a subject matter, the 
Court should not inf er or add provisions involving that sub-
j ect matter not so specifically discussed. 
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11 
Likewise, subparagraph 3 (b) is ignored by an inter-
pretation which invokes subparagraph 3 ( c) upon the vol-
untary resignation of an employee. Subparagraph 3 ( c) is 
designed to prote0t employees at the instance of a termina-
tion by the Corporation. Subparagraph 3 (b) offers ade-
quate protection to employees in the event they voluntarily 
resign. To enlarge the scope of subparagraph 3 (c) is to 
limit the scope of subparagraph 3 (b). 
The District Judge, in his Memorandum Decision on 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, appears to have 
done just that and to have ignored the first option provi-
sion of subparagraph 3 (b). The Memorandum Decision on 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment gives the basis for 
the ruling which is here being appealed. That memoran-
dum decision lists the restrictions upon the sale of Vulcan 
Steel Corporation stock and then reasons that the restric-
tions reflect the intention of the parties to provide for 
mandatory redemption by the Corporation rather than to 
permit the stock to be sold or transferred by the parties to 
the Agreement (R. 132 & 133). This reasoning is specious 
because it fails to distinguish between a mandatory obliga-
tion to redeem and restrictions upon the sale of stock to 
outsiders. Merely because a corporation imposes certain 
restrictions upon the sale of its stock does not mean that 
it has a mandatory obligation to redeem. 'Subparagraph 3 
(b) specifically gives the employee the right to sell to an 
outsider after having first given the Corporation an oppor-
tunity to redeem. This first option provision was not men-
tioned in the memorandum decision, thereby creating the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
impression that the employees had no option but to sell to 
the Corporation and that the Corporation had a correspond-
ing obligation to purchase under every set of circumstances. 
G. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION PER-
MITS THE RESPONDENT TO PROFIT 
FROM HIS OWN WRONG BY BREACHING 
THE TERMS OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT. 
If the Court's interpretation is sustained, it permits 
this respondent to voluntarily resign and force the Corpor-
ation to purchase his stock at a premium, when in fact, as 
a result of his breach of employment contract, the Oorpor-
ation is suffering substantial damage. On page 5 under 
the mandatory repurchase provisions, the formula provides 
for payment for good-will computed at two and one-half 
times the yearly average profits during the previous five 
years. The actual facts of this case are that Vulcan Steel 
Corporation made money while Markosian was in its em-
ploy, since it permitted the Corporation to capitalize upon 
the joint efforts of both Markosian and Gerstner. The Cor-
poration now, without the benefit of this top echelon, man-
agement and ability, has in fact suffered financially and 
will continue to suffer until a suitable replacement can 
either be trained or hired from other sources, which is very 
difficult. The profits of the Corporation have declined 
since the resignation of Markosian. The respondent Mar-
kosian knows better than anyone else the problems he has 
left the Corporation; yet his construction of the Agreement 
would permit him to leave the Corporation voluntarily and 
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then require the Corporation to pay him a premium for his 
stock in the Corporation. The Agreement provides that the 
respondent devote his entire time and efforts to the affairs 
of the Corporation for a period of five years, which period 
of time has not yet elapsed (R. 7 & 8). Respondent Markos-
ian is therefore breaching this provision of the Agreement. 
If the present interpretation of the Agreement is sus-
tained requiring a mandatory repurchase of Markosian's 
stock at a premium, thus permitting the respondent to 
profit from his own wrong, Gerstner hereby serves notice 
that he may be required to inwke the provisions of sub-
paragraph 3 ( e) requiring a liquidation and dissolution of 
the Corporation and distribution to the parties of their 
respe0tive interests. Such undesirable procedure would at 
least permit both of the parties to be treated on the same 
basis and receive such value as rightfully belongs to both 
parties rather than permitting a wrongdoer to receive a 
premium at the expense of the innocent remaining party. 
Not only is the Corporation losing the benefit of Mar-
kosian's services in a crucial area, damaging the Corpora-
tion and causing loss of profits, but in addition, Markosian 
is now a competitor of the Corporation and is soliciting 
and procuring business from former customers and new 
business which might have been available to the Corpora-
tion. Under such circumstances, it is unconsciona;ble for 
the Court to make a strained interpretation of this Agree-
ment, ignoring provisions of the contract, and reading into 
the contract provisions not intended by the parties, thus 
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permitting this respondent to profit by his own wrongful 
conduct. 
D. SUBPARAGRAPH 3 (C) 
CONSTRUED AGAINST 
SHOULD BE 
RESPONDENT 
MARKOSIAN SINCE THIS PROVISION 
WAS INITIALLY DRAFTED BY HIS AT-
TORNEY. 
The Court, before ruling on these provisions of the 
Agreement, should receive evidence which would show that 
the respondent, as a minority stockholder, was concerned 
about protecting himself and not having his investment 
frozen into the Col"poration in the event the Corporation 
terminated his employment. This is a matter over which 
he would have no control; however, he does have control 
over voluntarily resigning and different criterions would 
therefore be involved in each instance. Because of this con-
cern of Markosian, his attorney suggested and drafted the 
provisions for the mandatory repurchase. 
Q. Now I want to refer to the Agreement of 
April 12th, 1which is marked "Markosian Exhibit 
No. l" and refer to paragraph 3-c, Mandatory Ob-
ligation to Purchase Stock Offered on page 5 and 
ask you if you would refer to that. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that clause prepared by your attor-
neys for insertion in this agreement at your re-
quest? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(Markosian Deposition p. 63, lines 18-25) 
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Under such circumstances, any uncertainty should be 
construed against respondent Markosian. 
"When the terms of a written contract have been 
chosen by one of the parties and merely assented to 
by the other, this fact will in some cases affect the 
interpretation that will be given to these terms by 
the court. * * * If, however, it is clear that 
the parties tried to make a valid contract, and the 
remaining doubt as to the proper interpretation is 
merely as to which of two possible and reasonable 
meanings should be adopted, the court will adopt 
the one which is the less favora:ble rin its 1egal effect 
to the party who chose the words." 
Corbin on Contracts, Section 559. 
E. IF THE AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS 
CONCERNING A MANDATORY REPUR-
CHASE, THEN THE COURT SHOULD RE-
CEIVE PAROL EVIDENCE AS TO THE 
INTENT OF THE PARTIES BECAUSE: 
1. The Agreement was not intended as an in-
tegrated document; rather, it contemplated a 
separate and additional employment contract 
which would define the rights and duties aris-
ing from employment. 
The rule against permitting parol evidence to aid in 
the construction of a written document is predicated upon 
the proposition that the written document is the final reci-
tation of the intelllt of the parties and was intended to cover 
all of the rights of the parties. Where it is clear, however .. 
that the written document was not illltended to be the f1inal 
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and complete embodiment of the intent of the parties, then 
additional evidence is permissible. By the very terms of 
the Agreement in question, it proviides that within 30 days 
after the signing of the Agreement, a contract of employ-
ment would be entered inito by and between the Corpora-
tion and Markosian (R. 8). This contract of employment 
was never consummated and, therefore, parol evidence 
should be permitted to show the intent of the parties as it 
pevtruined to the general subject of the employment of the 
defendant. 
2. The divergent opinions of the parties would 
at least indicate that the contract is uncertain 
in this regard and requires amplifioation by 
parol evidence. 
All the foregoing arguments would indicrute that the 
Court should rule as a matter of law that there is no man-
datory repurchase requirement specified in the Agreement 
where the respondent voluntarily resigns his employment 
with the Corporation. These arguments, if not conclusive, 
certainly have sufficient merit to indicate that the contract 
is n1ot clear on this subject matter, but raJther is uncertain. 
If there is uncertruinty or ambiguity or if the language is 
susceptible of more than one meaning, then the Trial Court 
should be permitted to receive evidence as to the true intent 
of the parties and the Pre-Trial Judge should not rule as a 
matter of law precluding such evidence. Ephraim Theatre 
Cornpany v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P. 2d 221 ( 1958); 
53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec. 266 (1945) .. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Pre-Trial Court's interpretation requiring manda-
tory repurchase of stock, after the voluntary resignation 
by fue respondent, disregards the language in the Agree-
ment which contemplates that the termination would be by 
the Corporation. Such interpretation ignores other sections 
of the Agreement which specif1ically discuss the situation 
in the event of voluntary resignations and the sale of stock 
to outsiders; it permits the respondent to profit from his 
own wrongdoing in breaching the terms of the five-year 
employment clause. In addiition, 1any uncertainty in the 
provisions of the contract on this issue should be construed 
against the respondent, who insisted upon such provisions 
and initially drafted them for insertion into the Agreement. 
Further, the Pre-Trial Judge should not rule as a matter 
of law precluding the Trial Court from considering the 
evidence that the Agreement was not intended as an inte-
gmted document and precluding parol eviidence as ,to the 
true intent of the parties since the Agreement, if not sus-
ceptible of the construction urged by the appellants, is then 
ambiguous and requires further amplification. But most 
of all, such construction should not be susta:ined to permirt 
this respondent to .profit from his own wrongdoings at the 
expense of the other parties ito the contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY and 
LLOYD GERBER 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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